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Abstract 
 
Bribery discriminates against honest companies by creating a barrier to entry in the form of a 
competitive disadvantage.  An important legal issue with significant implications is whether recent 
international anti-corruption laws have leveled the playing field for firms doing business abroad.  
One of the first laws proscribing illicit payments to foreign public officials is the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA), initially enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1977.  From its inception, the 
FCPA has been criticized for placing U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage based on the fact 
that few countries outlawed bribery of foreign officials.  In the past ten years, several 
international treaties have been ratified that seek to criminalize bribery and eliminate the tax 
deductibility of corrupt payments made to foreign public officials.  This paper discusses anti-
corruption laws and their effectiveness in creating a transparent business environment that 
discourages bribery.        
 
 
Introduction 
 
wenty-five years ago, bribery and corruption in association with international trade was prevalent, 
and to a certain extent, widely tolerated.  Corruption in international trade was brought to the 
attention of the American public as a result of the Watergate investigation.  The Office of the Special 
Prosecutor uncovered the existence of secret corporate “slush funds” commonly used by U.S. corporations to bribe 
foreign officials.  These illicit payments ranged from minimal “grease payments” to government employees to 
ensure performance of ministerial duties, to substantial payments of bribes to government officials to obtain 
contracts (Sheffet, p. 290).  In an effort to determine the extent to which these “slush funds” were being utilized, the 
Securities Exchange Commission initiated a voluntary disclosure program encouraging companies to conduct in-
house investigations of questionable activities.  In a report to Congress, the SEC indicated that over 200 companies 
admitted making questionable foreign payments totaling over $300 million.  One of the most devastating facts to 
emerge from this investigation was the extent to which these companies were falsifying entries in their corporate 
books and records in an effort to conceal those payments (Cruver, p. 2).  In response to increasing public sentiment 
against political corruption, the U.S. Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977.  The 
FCPA is a sui generis law – that is a domestic criminal law applicable to acts committed outside the U.S. and was 
the first law prohibiting bribery in international transactions.   
 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act    
 
 The FCPA applies to firms under the jurisdiction of the Securities Exchange Commission.  The anti-bribery 
provisions of the FCPA prohibit a company from giving, directly or indirectly through a third party, anything of 
value to a foreign official, political party, or political candidate, to obtain or retain business.  In 1988, the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act specifically excluded facilitating or “grease payments” made to a non-decision-
making clerical or ministerial official from coverage under the FCPA.  There are significant penalties for violating 
the FCPA.  A person found guilty of violating this act may be fined up to $100,000 and/or receive a five-year prison 
sentence. A corporation may be fined up to $2,000,000 for violating the anti-bribery provisions (FCPA, §78dd-2(g)).  
In addition, the act includes provisions for potential commercial consequences including suspension or denial of an 
export license and loss of the privilege of doing business with the government.  
T 
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 When the FCPA was passed in 1977, very few countries outlawed the payment of bribes to foreign 
officials.  Furthermore, many countries permitted a tax deduction for corrupt payments made in connection with 
foreign trade.  Consequently, there was little, if any, incentive within the business community to bring pressure to 
stop illicit payments.    As markets in the world’s transitional economies opened to foreign investment, the immature 
regulatory systems failed to provide the checks and balances necessary to control corruption.  Consequently, these 
economies were fertile ground for corruption.  After the FCPA was enacted, many businesses reported that they 
would have to forego some overseas business opportunities, particularly in emerging markets where corruption was 
rampant.  Thus, the primary criticism of the FCPA is that it places U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage.       
 
Adverse Consequences of Bribery 
 
 Like other white-collar crimes, many people assume that bribery is a victimless crime.  This assumption 
could not be further from the truth.  Bribery has negative consequences that present obstacles to social and economic 
development.  For example, bribery places honest firms at a competitive disadvantage in the form of a barrier to 
entry.  Thus, corruption may actually discourage competition or even lead to divestment.  Another adverse 
consequence associated with bribery occurs when government officials are induced by bribery to enter into 
contracts.  In this instance, corrupt payments may prevent the public from receiving optimal value for their money.  
Bribery also has the potential to lead to diversion of public funds to enrich individuals.  For example, when 
organizations such as the World Bank invest capital in public works projects, corruption and bribery may lead to 
contracts being awarded to inefficient or even incompetent firms at inflated cost.  Tolerance of corruption helps to 
undermine the judicial system and good governance in general and impedes economic prosperity.            
 
International Efforts to Eliminate Bribery and Corruption 
 
 Corrupt business practices are not confined to just a few countries.  In an effort to level the playing field, 
the United States has exerted diplomatic pressure on its international trading partners to outlaw bribery of foreign 
officials and politicians.  At times, the United States has been criticized for acting as a moral imperialist by trying to 
impose American cultural standards to actions that occur in other societies.  However, in an increasingly global 
economy, most countries have come to the realization that there is no logical justification for the discrepancy in 
treatment between bribing foreign officials and domestic officials.   
 
 Significant steps have been taken by supranational organizations including the Organization of American 
States, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations, and the World Bank in an 
attempt to legislate moral business conduct abroad.  The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) 
was the first regional anti-corruption treaty.  The Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the IACAC in 
1996.  The OAS recognized that bribery and corruption not only undermine democracy, but also have significant 
economic and social costs that are difficult to measure.  According to the OAS, the primary goal of this treaty was to 
strengthen cooperation among member nations in an effort to fight corruption in the hemisphere.  The IACAC 
signatory countries agreed to specific preventative and remedial measures to eliminate corruption and have 
implemented a means to monitor compliance with key provisions.  Each country is to report the level of progress in 
developing a legal framework for implementing the IACAC and evaluate its adequacy.  This report to the OAS also 
addresses to what extent results have been generated. 
 
 In December 1997, ministers of the thirty countries comprising the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, along with five other countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and Slovakia), signed the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Convention).  This convention went into effect on February 15, 1999, and its provisions criminalize bribery and seek 
to eliminate tax deductions for corrupt payments made to foreign public officials.  In part it provides that the 
signatory countries will take necessary steps to establish criminal laws prohibiting  
 
“any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or 
through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or a third party, in order that the official act or 
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refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other 
improper advantage in the conduct of international business.” (OECD Convention, Article 1)   
 
 As of December 13, 2002, all thirty OECD countries and four of the five other countries (excluding 
Slovakia) had ratified the convention.  In an effort to support the OECD anti-bribery convention, the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) adopted Rules of Conduct with which it asks its members to comply.  These Rules of 
Conduct prohibit the demand or payment of a bribe and require transparency in accounting. 
 
On October 31, 2003, The U.N. General Assembly adopted the first truly global response to anti-
corruption, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAG).  The UNCAG contains measures aimed 
at preventing corruption and establishes a comprehensive set of guidelines for all countries to follow.  The primary 
provisions of this convention provide for international monitoring, public and private sector transparency in 
accounting, cooperative prosecution, and criminalizing corrupt activities such as bribery, trading in influence, and 
the “laundering” the proceeds of illegal activities.     
 
The World Bank has also taken a stand against corruption.  In 1997, the World Bank adopted a 
comprehensive strategy aimed at preventing corruption associated with projects it finances.  As part of their anti-
corruption strategy, the World Bank also agreed to help countries around the world fight corruption and to support 
international efforts to eliminate corruption.   
 
Bribe Payers Index (BPI) 
 
Transparency International (TI) is a unique international organization dedicated to reducing corruption.  In 
an effort to create tools to measure corruption, TI established the Bribe Payer’s Index (BPI) in 1999.  A second 
survey was completed in 2002. The BPI is based on Gallup surveys conducted in fifteen emerging market countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, 
South Africa, South Korea, and Thailand).  The survey questions relate to the propensity of twenty-one countries to 
bribe high-level public officials in connection with obtaining and retaining international business.  The BPI uses the 
results from these surveys to measure an exporting country’s propensity to bribe while conducting business abroad.    
The following charts illustrate the results of these surveys.  The higher the score, the lower the perceived propensity 
to bribe.  Thus, the best possible score is 10.  It should be noted that the average BPI for the respondent countries 
was 1.9, indicating a culture where it was perceived that a significant level of corruption existed.  
 
Comparing the results of the 1999 BPI poll to the 2002 BPI poll, the mean for all countries included in the 
BPI increased from 5.931 to 5.985.  This improvement in the BPI mean may be due in part to increased international 
attention being placed on anti-corruption efforts.  At the time the 2002 BPI survey was conducted, the OECD 
Convention was the most comprehensive international anti-corruption initiative.  According to Transparency 
International, most of the countries included in the 2002 survey had ratified the OECD Convention as of May 14, 
2002, with the exception of Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, China, and Russia.   
 
The chart below compares 1999 and 2002 mean BPI scores for countries that had ratified the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions with those of 
the countries participating in the BPI poll that had not signed the OECD Convention as of May 14, 2002. 
 
The mean score for the countries that had not ratified the OECD Convention prior to the 2002 BPI survey 
was 4.233 while the mean score for the countries that had already ratified the OECD Convention was 6.686.  Thus, 
the 2002 poll indicated that countries that had ratified the OECD Convention were approximately 37% less likely to 
engage in bribery than non-signatory countries.  When comparing the results of the 1999 BPI to the 2002 BPI, the 
mean score for the non-signatory countries of Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, and China increased from 4.05 to 4.233, 
indicating that their propensity to bribe had declined.  Russia and Hong Kong were not included in this calculation 
because they were not part of the 1999 BPI.   
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                             Volume 3, Number 9 
 18 
TI Bribe Payers Index 1999/2002
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Au
st
ra
lia
Sw
ed
en
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Au
st
ria
C
an
ad
a
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Be
lg
iu
m U
K
Si
ng
ap
or
e
G
er
m
an
y
Sp
ai
n
Fr
an
ce
U
SA
Ja
pa
n
M
al
ay
si
a
H
on
g 
Ko
ng
Ita
ly
S.
 K
or
ea
Ta
iw
an
C
hi
na
R
us
si
a
D
om
es
tic
Source: Transparency International www.transparency.org
1999 2002
 
 
Effect of Signing OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention on BPI Mean
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1999 2002
Source: Transparency International 
www.transparency.org
Ratified
Not Signed
 
 
 
The mean BPI score of the 15 countries that had ratified the OECD Convention increased from 6.433 in 
1999 to 6.686 in 2002.  One inference is that countries that had ratified the Convention may be more cognizant of 
the adverse effects of bribery.  Twelve of these countries increased their BPI score in 2002 and Canada’s remained 
unchanged.  The score for the United Kingdom and the United States decreased, a sign that the perceived propensity 
to bribe actually increased in these two countries from 1999 to 2002. 
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Conclusion 
 
Corruption is a complex and pervasive international problem that has found its place on the world’s agenda.  
In the past ten years, significant steps have been taken by both individual governments and supranational 
organizations to combat bribery.  Overall, the BPI indicates that perceived bribery associated with international 
business transactions decreased slightly from 1999 to 2002.  While this is encouraging news, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether firms doing business abroad have become more ethical or simply more cautious.  Without 
significant means of enforcement for international treaties and regulations, these attempts to reduce bribery of 
foreign officials may fail to deter illicit acts.  Unfortunately, one can prescribe morality through legislation but 
acceptance of the moral tenet is an individual decision. 
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